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INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
By W. Van Alstyne.' Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 
1984. Pp. 130. $24.75. 
Pierre Sch/ag2 
There is something refreshing (and these days rare) about a 
piece of persuasive legal writing which graciously invites readers to 
accept some conclusions rather than attempting to overbear their 
will with inexorable logic. Van Alstyne's Interpretations of the First 
Amendment is of this rare, refreshing genre.3 Its prose is lucid, its 
tone measured, and its style serene. It exudes reasonableness and 
good sense. 
This thoughtfulness is brought to bear on a number of seem-
ingly disparate first amendment problems. 4 The first chapter is a 
leisurely stroll through a small museum of conventional interpreta-
tions of the free speech clause. Each interpretation can claim some 
basis in the text of the Constitution, its history, and its past judicial 
exposition. While the various interpretations diverge in some re-
spects, they can nonetheless ultimately be seen to cohere. The sec-
ond chapter is a sustained argument against construing the press 
clause more generously than the free speech clause. Van Alstyne's 
examination of the consequences of adopting a contrary position 
makes this conclusion seem sensible as well. The last chapter ex-
plores the different treatment accorded to the electronic and printed 
press under the first amendment. Here, too, Van Alstyne's conclu-
sion seems reasonable: "[E]ven on the bicentennial of our Constitu-
tion, we have not yet reconciled the interpretive difficulties of the 
first amendment in respect to scarcity, property and government 
policy."s 
From whence does all this reasonableness and good sense 
spring? In large part, it can be attributed to a first rate display of 
I. William R. and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
Law. 
2. Assistant Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. 
3. W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984). 
4. Van Alstyne's book is a collection of previously published essays. The introduction 
is an abridged version of Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Spe-
cial Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983). Chapter I is an adaptation 
of A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107 (1982). Chapter 2 is 
an amalgamation of two previous articles, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Com-
ment on Some New Trends and Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. I (1980), and The Hazards 
to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977). Chapter 3 is a 
reincarnation of The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 
S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978). 
5. W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 3, at 90. 
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legal advocacy. Van Alstyne takes great pains not to overstate his 
conclusions, to recognize counterarguments and to admit the limi-
tations of his own contributions. But more importantly, Van Al-
styne's positions are animated by a vision of constitutional 
interpretation which itself seems quite reasonable-and appears all 
the more so once situated in the intellectual context of alternative 
constitutional theories. 
In the introduction, Van Alstyne advises us to abandon efforts 
at judicial revision or improvement of the Constitution and invites 
us, instead, to make sense of "this Constitution. "6 In making sense 
of this Constitution, we should be guided first and foremost by its 
text, though we may be allowed to draw insight (and authority?) 
from "a fair assessment of its history [and] its past judicial exposi-
tion."7 Van Alstyne never quite tells us what he means by "the 
text," "its history," and "its past judicial exposition"-nor does he 
tell us quite how these materials are to be interpreted. Of course, 
Van Alstyne could claim that his three essays on the first amend-
ment demonstrate the appropriate interpretive approach. Maybe. 
If so, then the most readily discernible features of this demonstra-
tion consist in a penchant for consequentialist arguments and a ten-
dency to begin interpretation with the text only to finish with what 
judicial precedent has bequeathed. Van Alstyne strives for a mini-
mal coherence in his interpretive efforts: "coherence" in the sense 
that he tries to make the text, history, and precedent hang together 
in a bundle of good sense, and "minimal" in the sense that he re-
fuses to dissolve controversy, ambiguity, and conflict in a finished 
theory. 
Van Alstyne's approach might be described as "consequential-
ist textualism." His is no miserly textualism: while the text enjoys 
a privileged position in the interpretation of this Constitution, it is 
not so authoritative that it must be observed without regard for the 
consequences. Quite the contrary, textual exegesis is to be per-
formed with a view towards the consequences that any proposed 
interpretation will yield. Nor is this textualism mechanistic: even 
when aided by history and judicial precedent, it will not always 
yield unambiguous answers. Indeed, Van Alstyne is to be praised 
for his sensitive treatment of a fundamental tension in his outlook. 
On one level, he is clearly calling us back to trying to make sense of 
the text. On another level, he is also telling us that when we look at 
the Constitution, there is a point at which we should stop making 
6. I d. at 3-20. For another attack on attempts to improve the Constitution by judicial 
channels, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). 
7. W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 3, at 47. 
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sense. Both of these positions are animated by his criticisms of 
scholars who cannot stop trying to make sense of the Constitution 
and are therefore led to abandoning the text. 
In order to understand why a general move towards textualism 
might seem appealing, it is necessary to appreciate the current intel-
lectual context. In marked contrast to Van Alstyne's serene style, 
current theoretical constitutional scholarship appears to exhibit in-
creasingly desperate gestures aimed ostensibly at reaching solid 
footing for normative analysis. The gestures become ever more 
frantic as successive attempts to ground constitutional theory fail to 
uncover a solid footing. Soon the purveyors of this literature (as 
well as their consumers) succumb to the vertigo of an infinite re-
gress. For instance, if one asks questions about the scope of judicial 
review, one might feel compelled to answer questions about political 
theory, which in turn might require that one refer to political phi-
losophy, whose claims in turn can only be redeemed by epistemo-
logical inquiries, which must perforce be limited by ontological 
givens, which in the (not truly) final analysis are rooted in the way 
in which we talk about things. So maybe the mistake was in fram-
ing a question about judicial review in the first place?s Perhaps, the 
initial inquiry should be reformulated?9 And then one begins the 
regress again, from a new starting point. 
My point here is quite simply that theoretical inquiry about the 
Constitution is increasingly willing to draw larger and larger circles 
around the text in order to find a secure footing from which the text 
might definitively (or at least satisfactorily) be read. The despera-
tion of this scholarship is a function of two variables: its insistence 
upon finding a secure footing (to which, as reasonable persons, we 
must all assent) and paradoxically, its willingness to seek out this 
secure footing in treacherous and largely unmapped foreign terri-
tory that seems far removed from the text. The practice of this type 
of scholarship yields some ironic results. First, the more one is will-
ing to entertain fundamental questions, the less obvious it is that 
one can provide noncontroversial answers. Hence, the more funda-
mental one gets, the less secure the footing one can find. Second, 
the further away one is from the text, the less obvious it is that one 
can get back to say anything meaningful or determinate (let alone, 
judicially useable) about the text. Indeed, by the time one begins to 
translate epistemological insights or philosophical breakthroughs 
8. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to 
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). 
9. Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1207 (1984). 
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into the stuff of constitutional case law or doctrine, these epistemo-
logical and philosophical achievements have begun to acquire a re-
markably indeterminate character. 
It is in this climate of intellectual disarray that Van Alstyne 
offers his sober advice to get back to the text. In his introduction, 
Van Alstyne takes aim at what he calls "nonstandard" or "special" 
theories. Within his sights are Ely's representation-reinforcing con-
cept, Choper's severance of certain federalism and separation of 
powers concerns from the Court's calendar, Michelman's elabora-
tion of the Rawlsian principles, and Chief Justice Marshall's early 
contributions.w Within range of Van Alstyne's arsenal are those 
theories which view the Constitution as all too clearly disappointing 
(and thus in need of judicial revision) and those theories which view 
the Constitution as too indefinite (and thus in need of 
improvisation).!! 
Van Alstyne's basic objection to these "nonstandard" or "spe-
cial" theories is that they are constitutional adventures. As these 
theoretical escapades come to an end, they give way to new inter-
pretive escapades, but not without leaving behind a residue of prece-
dent.I2 As if this were not bad enough in itself, Van Alstyne blames 
the "special" theories for their contribution to the relative desue-
tude of the amendment process: given the liberties which the Jus-
tices seem to take with the existing text, lord knows what they 
would do if we gave them any more raw material to work with. In 
the parent article to the introduction, he attacked the special theo-
ries because "each requires too much suspension of one's own 
grounds for disbelief."I3 And in an article published after his book, 
Van Alstyne challenges special theories by asking how well each 
would fare if "it were already a clear and an established feature of 
the Constitution?"I4 Van Alstyne suggests that, once placed in this 
context, support for the special theories would be less than unre-
strained enthusiasm. All in all, Van Alstyne opines, most of the 
special theories "will eventually be seen at a later date as but the 
academic residue of yet another period in which American constitu-
tional law records its native propensity for instability and rank 
politicization." 1s 
10. More victims of Van Alstyne's assaults could be cited. See W. VAN ALSTYNE, 
supra note 3, at 7 nn.21-26. 
11. For an argument that Van Alstyne's attacks on special theories do not address the 
work actually done by his targets, see Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Re-
sponse to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1435, 1443-55 (1984). 
12. W. VAN AI..SfYNE, supra note 3, at 6. 
13. Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution, supra note 4 at 233 n.63. 
14. Van Alstyne, Notes on A Bicentennial Constitution, 1984 U. ILL L. REv. 933, 953. 
15. W. VAN AI..SfYNE, supra note 3, at 14. 
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One of Van Alstyne's objections seems to be that the special 
theorists are fundamentally uninterested in the conscientious inter-
pretation of this Constitution and simply view the document as one 
more vehicle for the furtherance of their political programs. It 
strikes me that no one is immune to this charge and that it is thus 
not a useful one to make--save as against those who intone that 
their approach to the Constitution does not partake of politics. 
Ironically, Van Alstyne's questioning of the desirability of in-
corporating the special theories into the constitutional text suggests 
implicitly that his objection may be not so much that these theories 
are animated by politics, but rather that they practice politics badly. 
Van Alstyne seems to think that the special theories are simply too 
fantastic to be believed. Perhaps these theories are simply too uto-
pian to be taken seriously; their adoption would require too much 
stretching of the legal and national culture? Of course, the question 
of how much the culture can be changed (or maintained) by altering 
our conceptions of the Constitution (or more broadly, the legal sys-
tem) is profoundly political. But even if Van Alstyne has left him-
self no (nonpolitical) place from which to charge the special 
theories with bad politics, the charge might be correct. 
Why might the special theories be such bad politics? One 
could focus on their content and argue that as far as utopias go, the 
ones offered by the special theorists are particularly ugly or undesir-
able. Van Alstyne's dismantling of Thayer's theory might be an ex-
ample of this approach.16 But generally, Van Alstyne focuses on 
the inadequacy of the form of the special theories. For instance, the 
"representationalist" political process theories, such as John Hart 
Ely's, are reduced by Van Alstyne to helpless blobs of indetermi-
nacy and triviality.'7 These theories are viewed as providing no 
guidance and no constraint on the Court's articulation of constitu-
tional law. 
I think that the plausibility of Van Alstyne's attack on special 
theories here derives from the form in which some of the purveyors 
of this literature present their theories. Theoretical schemes are ad-
vanced, as if somehow, their ruling categories and concepts will dic-
tate appropriate decisions as the Supreme Court works through its 
constitutional calendar.ts This allows Van Alstyne and others to 
16. /d. at 95-96 n.37. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Consti-
tutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). 
17. W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 3, at 9-11. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
18. For a discussion of the same point as regards "categorical" theories of freedom of 
speech, see Schlag, An Attack on Cotegorica/ Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 671, 706-39 (1983). 
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justifiably point out that the special theories are indeterminate, that 
they do not compel conclusions and outcomes in concrete cases.l9 
If constitutional theory were more modest in its ambitions, less con-
cerned with its potential for immediate translation into judicial 
opinions, Van Alstyne's attacks would seem far less powerful. 
Another of Van Alstyne's objections to special theories seems 
to concern the sources of interpretation used by the special theo-
rists; the special theories do not pay sufficient attention to the tradi-
tional sources of constitutional authority (e.g., the text) or they pay 
too much attention to nontraditional sources of interpretation (e.g., 
German philosophers).2o The first claim is hard to prove-particu-
larly since Van Alstyne's vision of the traditional sources of author-
ity (the text, its history, and its judicial exposition) is left generously 
vague. No doubt, it is easier for Van Alstyne to pursue the second 
claim-that the special theories improperly rely on nontraditional 
sources. After all, the proof can easily be found in a special theory's 
citation of Kant or Marx or Rawls, etc. Van Alstyne could cer-
tainly object that none of these folks can be considered an authority 
on the Constitution of the United States. It all depends, of course, 
upon what one means by the term "authority." That, in tum, de-
pends upon one's theory. In any case, it is difficult to dismiss the 
thought (and I am not sure Van Alstyne does) that these nonlegal 
luminaries might provide some useful insights into or a frame of 
reference for the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Still, Van Alstyne's attack might be on the right track: some 
commentators seem to treat the nonlegal folks (Kant, Rawls, Der-
rida, etc.) as if these had already been anointed in fact as the ulti-
mate sources of authority in our legal system. This somewhat 
comic, and sometimes ironic, canonization of such unlikely figures 
can hardly be considered integral to the use of nontraditional 
sources of interpretation; rather it might more sensibly be ascribed 
to the fascination of American legal academics with authority and 
endless documentation. In any case, I fail to see why an interpre-
tive insight into the Constitution is to be automatically tainted (or 
rejected?) simply because it is traceable to Kant, Marx, or Foucault, 
or for that matter, Aristotle, Hume, or Austin. 
Ultimately, Van Alstyne's central objection to the special theo-
ries is not philosophical but consequentialist. Special theories are 
not appropriate because they have no staying power and because 
they allow too much license in the judiciary to do as it pleases with 
this Constitution. Of course, these arguments can be turned back 
19. W. VAN Al.sTYNE, supra note 3, at 10-11; Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1051-56. 
20. W. VAN Al.sTYNE, supra note 3, at 18. 
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on Van Alstyne's textualism. Indeed, one might argue that the 
adoption of so many special theories by the Supreme Court at vari-
ous times suggests that it is the text which has no staying power. 
Moreover, if history shows anything (and that certainly is in ques-
tion), it is that the text can be made to mean a great many things. 
Van Alstyne does, however, suggest some limitations on how 
we might interpret the text. He invites us to follow Justice Rob-
erts's dictum to apply the Constitution as aT-square to the actions 
of government.2' In each case, the question is whether one line 
squares with the other. So far so good. The burden of showing 
where the constitutional line lies is not with the court but with the 
litigants. Which litigant? The one who has the burden of proof.zz 
Which one is that? We can tell from the text of this Constitution: if 
the claim is that a statute is beyond the scope of federal power, for 
instance, it is incumbent upon the claimant advocating the validity 
of the legislation to show that it is pursuant to the Constitution. On 
the other hand, if the claim is that the statute violates the first 
amendment, it is incumbent upon the rights claimant to show where 
the first amendment line lies and that it has been overreached by the 
government. Van Alstyne's allocation of the burden of proof re-
quires us to distinguish that which the Constitution authorizes from 
that which it forbids. This suggestion, of course, is of no help where 
the issue is precisely whether a piece of constitutional text estab-
lishes an authorization or a prohibition or something else. 
More problematic is the question of how the litigants might go 
about making arguments to support their view of where the consti-
tutional line lies and whether it has been overreached. Here one can 
take either an unkind view of Van Alstyne's proposition or a more 
sympathetic one. The unkind view: Van Alstyne has solved the 
problem of constitutional interpretation; he has put the burden of 
its invention on the litigants. The sympathetic account: the way 
one defends or attacks an interpretation of the text is ultimately a 
contextual matter that works itself out in practice and not one 
which can usefully (nor indeed ought to) be answered by generaliza-
tions. None, that is, save one: special theories should not serve as 
the context from which the text is to be interpreted. 
Van Alstyne's first chapter, "A Graphic Review of the Free 
Speech Clause," corroborates indirectly that his position lies on 
some fence between my unkind and sympathetic accounts. This 
first chapter has two main points: first, that a number of divergent 
interpretations of the first amendment are consistent with the text, 
21. /d. at 12-18. 
22. /d. at 15, 17. 
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and second, that this is not so bad as one might think.2J In a series 
of eleven graphics, Van Alstyne paints a series of possible interpre-
tations of the freedom of speech clause-all arguably consonant 
with the text. The chapter moves from the simplest absolutist posi-
tion to more complicated visions including the two speech theories, 
the clear and present danger permutations, and the subcategoriza-
tion of first amendment speech. Each move from one interpretation 
to the next is impelled by the "irresistible counterexample" (for in-
stance, shouting fire in a crowded theater), or by some perceived 
inadequacy of the previous interpretation.24 In virtually all cases 
the movement from one interpretation to the next is motivated by 
consequentialist concerns. In other words, we notice that any given 
interpretation will have some effect which for some reason we are 
not supposed to like, and thus we move on to the next interpretation 
which solves our problem but in tum produces new ones. 
Van Alstyne assures us that the divergences among the com-
peting or supplementary interpretations are no reason for cynicism 
or despair. For one thing, all these interpretations are but specifica-
tions of a single comprehensive interpretation of the first 
amendment: 
The question in each case is whether the circumstances were sufficiently compelling 
to justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law, given the relationship of 
the speech abridged to the presuppositions of the first amendment, and the relation-
ship of the Jaw to the responsibilities of the level of government that has presumed 
to act.2S 
This standard, obviously, will not reassure those who are concerned 
about the indeterminacies of the textualist mode.26 On the contrary, 
they will take it as confirmation that their worst fear is correct: the 
text can be made to mean just about anything. Similarly, this stan-
dard is not likely to win over anyone who views judges as other than 
wholly benevolent and insightful.27 Van Alstyne has a message for 
the cynics and the skeptics: much more than this standard is not to 
be expected from the Constitution.2s Don't expect so much, it's only 
law. 
For those who remain troubled that the free speech clause 
might mean so many things, Van Alstyne offers the palliative: 
23. Id. at 22, 47-48. 
24. Id. at 24-46. 
25. Id. at 48. 
26. See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution, supra note 4, at 228 (Van Alstyne 
acknowledges the ambiguity of language and concedes that even conscientious commitments 
to textualism will yield different interpretations). 
27. See W. VAN ALsTYNE, supra note 3, at 49 (Van Alstyne assumes "a conscientious 
willingness in the judiciary to try" to make this formulation work). 
28. ld. 
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"[T]he free speech clause's good faith administration has nonethe-
less very probably provided the United States with a greater mea-
sure of actually protected free speech than we would otherwise have 
had."29 What do statements like this mean? Think about this one, 
for instance: "The inclusion of the violin as a major instrument in 
the symphony orchestra has very probably provided the western 
world with greater actual virtuosity than we would otherwise have 
had." I would not want to argue against this claim. On the other 
hand, I would want to point out that there is no significant move-
ment trying to get orchestra companies to fire their violinists. It's 
just not an issue. 
But perhaps Van Alstyne does think it is an issue. He might be 
concerned, for instance, that as the personnel of the Court changes, 
more of its music will begin to sound in the key of some very 
strange and undesirable special theory.Jo Viewed from this perspec-
tive, Van Alstyne's work might be seen, not so much as a plea for 
textualism, but as an attempt to vindicate, rationalize, and entrench 
conventional judicial interpretations of the free speech and press 
clauses. 
Indeed, perhaps this review has put Van Alstyne's cart before 
its horse. Perhaps the real message of Van Alstyne's work is not, 
"Let us return to the text and this is how to do it," but rather, "Let 
us protect the received judicial wisdom on the first amendment and 
rationalize and preserve it by means of an enlightened consequen-
tialist textualism." 
There is much to support this latter reading of Van Alstyne's 
work. Mter all the bulk of the interpretations he derives from the 
consequentialist examination of the text coincide rather well with 
conventional judicial interpretations of both the free speech and 
press clauses. Indeed, radical or exotic visions of the text are con-
spicuously absent from his interpretive efforts. The problem is that 
a renewed commitment to making sense of this text of the Constitu-
tion clearly does not require that interpretations be limited to such 
conventional stuff. Why does Van Alstyne derive nothing but this 
conventional stuff from the text? I think there are two possible 
answers. 
First, Van Alstyne might believe that plausible interpretations 
of the first amendment must be confined to a fairly narrow reading 
29. /d. at 47. 
30. Van Alstyne disavows such political concerns: "[T)he suggestion that the judicial 
task of constitutional review should be performed with the same undissembling interest in 
accuracy as one would bring to his or her own workbench is, nonetheless, a proposal of 
enormous and lasting appeal." !d. at 12. 
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of judicial precedent. But if a narrow reading of precedent is to 
inform the interpretation of the first amendment, then it is the au-
thority and the interpretation of precedent which require explana-
tion and justification, not textualism. While, indeed, Van Alstyne's 
interpretations of the free speech and free press clause seem consis-
tent with much of the judicial interpretation of those clauses, I do 
not believe that Van Alstyne relies upon precedent to justify his in-
terpretations.JI It is more the other way around. Van Alstyne's 
interpretations can be seen to rationalize and justify the mass of 
precedent.J2 
If so, we are brought to the second possible explanation for the 
conventionalism of Van Alstyne's interpretations. This convention-
alism can be seen to result from the consequentialist approach Van 
Alstyne adopts. The consequentialist approach to the text requires 
the positing of both good and bad effects resulting from any given 
interpretation. At its simplest level, the practicing consequentialist 
must possess a schedule of good and bad effects as well as a rudi-
mentary understanding of how legal interpretations cause effects. 
Van Alstyne does not elaborate either his schedule of good and bad 
effects, nor does he pause to consider how interpretations cause ef-
fects. Either would require something very much like a special 
theory. 
In the introduction, Van Alstyne offers, I think, powerful rea-
sons for rejecting "special" theories and adopting textualism. But 
as soon as he begins to put textualism into practice at the beginning 
of the first chapter, it becomes apparent that he will have to develop 
something like special theories. So there it is: when one is ruled by 
special theories, it makes good consequentialist sense to return to 
the text. When one practices textualist interpretation, it makes 
good consequentialist sense to develop special theories. And so on. 
31. See id. at 22 (where Van Alstyne directs his interpretive strategy away from plung-
ing into precedent and attempting to sort things out from there). 
32. /d. ("The different interpretations of the clause to be reviewed . . . include virtu-
ally all principal interpretations . . . and, treated as they will be here, they may . . . tum out 
to be less at odds with one another than one might suppose.") 
